Most of the banks receiving capital injections from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) issued preferred stock to taxpayers. This paper looks at the factors that affect publicly traded banks' ability to pay the scheduled TARP preferred stock dividends.
Introduction
In response to the financial crisis of 2008, the government implemented the Troubled Asset Relieve Program (TARP). Its largest program the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) purchased preferred stocks from U.S. bank holding companies. Preferred stocks (compared to common stocks) have received less attention in the academic literature. Yet, the issuance of preferred stock has grown in recent years. Prior to the crisis, there has been a shift in the composition of bank capital. Acharya et al. (2009) find that many banks had started to rely less on common equity and more on preferred shares. As preferred shares have become more widespread, it is important to study the preferred dividend payment behavior of banks issuing preferred shares.
Traditionally, dividend payout behavior has been explained by the expectation for future earnings. See Lintner (1956) . Other explanations for common stock dividend payment behavior come from signaling theory, the clientele effect, and the tax benefits of capital gains versus dividends. See Brav et al. (2005) . Denis and Osobov (2008) cast doubt on the current validity of the signaling and clientele explanations. In the banking literature, Onali (2009) finds that dividends are associated with a higher default risk, consistent with moral hazard behavior. Cornet et al. (2008) find that common stock dividends have a strong signaling content. In this paper, we investigate possible explanations for the decisions of publicly traded TARP recipient banks to pay or skip dividends on their bailout preferred shares.
We build a predictive model that identifies the determinants of the decision of TARP recipient to skip preferred dividend payments. This decision will be determined by the size of banks (smaller size could imply less analyst coverage and potential agency problems), potential growth opportunities, capitalization, and overall financial performance. Our results suggest that the publicly traded banks missing Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) preferred stock dividends are significantly smaller, have weaker capital ratios, are less profitable. Dividend skippers also have lower market to book ratios than banks paying their scheduled dividends. In a multivariate logistic model, we
show that higher non-performing asset ratios, smaller bank size, and lower tier 2 capital ratios are significant predictors of the failure to pay dividends. This paper may be of interest to academics, preferred stock investors, and government policy makers. When banks miss public dividends, or worse-fail, these missed dividends or failures are of national interest.
1 Moreover, never before has the U.S. had such a large issuance of preferred stock in a short period of time. This paper takes advantage of a unique opportunity to study what drives the performance of these government directed investments.
The government sector made huge preferred stock investments to stem the panic of . Dash (2009 Preferred stock is a hybrid security with features of both debt and equity. It is junior to all kinds of debt in the capital structure and thus has relatively low recovery rates relative to debt. Yet, it is senior to common stock in bankruptcy. Keenan (2000) estimates that the average preferred stock recovery rates given default from 1970 to 1999
were about 11 percent of par compared to 49 percent of par for senior unsecured bonds.
Yet, preferred stock tends to pay relatively stable and high dividends. Thus, it sometimes is attractive to more adventurous fixed income investors, who shun common stock.
Preferred stock generally does not have voting rights, which makes it attractive to the government policy makers fearful of charges of "nationalization."
The Capital Purchase Program is the program most susceptible to empirical tests because of the large number of institutions participating in it. Nevertheless, the U.S. government's total preferred stock investments among many different financial rescue programs starting in 2008 easily dwarfs private sector preferred stock outstanding in the United States. The government had a par value of $13.9 billion of preferred stock in the auto lender GMAC LLC, now called Ally Financial, according to SIGTARP (2010, p. 42 ). Yet, those investments were made under the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) and much of that preferred stock was could be converted into common shares. In addition to $50 billion of Capital Purchase Program monies invested in Bank of America and Citigroup, an additional $40 billion was invested in exchange for further preferred stock and warrants as part of the Targeted Investment Program (TIP). Both Bank of America and Citigroup repaid those TIP preferred shares in December 2009, according to Wilson and Wu (2010b) . The U.S. Government had commitments to buy $69.8 billion in preferred stock in AIG, which has never made a TARP dividend. About $47.5 billion of that $68.8 billion commitment had been used by AIG by June 30, 2010. AIG also missed $5.5 billion in TARP dividends, according to SIGTARP (2010, p. 40) . ProPublica (accessed online on August 2, 2010, at http://bailout.propublica.org/programs/10-preferred-stock-investments) lists the U.S. Government's preferred stock investments in the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at $83.6 billion and $61.3 billion, respectively. Those latter investments were not part of the TARP legislation. Thus, by the time of writing, the U.S. Treasury has received in less than two years preferred stock with a par value in excess of $400 billion or over twice the market value of the preferred stocks outstanding in the U.S. in 2005, according to Dash (2009) . 3 See Paulson (2010, pp. 337-338) , which discusses the U. S. Treasury's deliberations in early October 2008 before the CPP was launched. The former Secretary of the U. S. Treasury, Henry Paulson, who launched the CPP wrote, "Buying common stock would strengthen capital ratios, but common shares This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the existing literature, in section 3, we discuss our hypotheses and in section 4 we describe the sample creation.
Next, in section 5, we introduce our empirical results. Finally, in section 6, we conclude our discussion.
Review of the Existing Literature
Because preferred stock is a niche security, there have been relatively few academic studies looking at preferred stock prior to the financial crisis of . Carty (1995 and Crabbe (1996) are the only academic studies that explore how skipping preferred stock dividends affects the prices of preferred shares. Carty (1995) finds that a month after a corporation skips its preferred stock dividend, its preferred stock trades for 40 percent of par on average. Crabbe (1996) uses dividend pass rates to estimate the appropriate yields of preferred stock for a risk neutral investor.
Most of the academic research on preferred stock has focused on questions of taxes and optimal capital structure. Bajaj et al. (2002) study over 3,000 new preferred stock issues from 1980 to 1999 and find that highly rated preferred shares are issued at lower yields than similarly rated bonds. They attribute this to the fact that preferred dividends are not tax deductable to issuers, but bond interest payments are. They find that this effect is reversed for junk-rated preferred stock issues. Thus yields are higher for junk-rated preferred shares than for junk-rated debt issues. This is likely due to the fact that the higher credit risks of preferred shares trump tax considerations. Harvey et al. (2003) found that the Federal (2010), and Ng et al. (2010) are all examples of studies that look at the characteristics of banks that enter the CPP. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2009) , find that banks that accepted TARP had significantly lower tier 1 capital ratios than banks that rejected TARP or did not apply for TARP funds. Wilson and Wu (2010b) Li (2010) , and Wilson and Wu (2010a) .
The event studies of Veronesi and Zingales (2010) and Kim and Stock (2010) investigate the effect of the preferred stock injections on the stock, bond, and preferred stock prices of the largest and earliest CPP recipients. finds that banks' share prices suffered as stringent executive pay restrictions were enacted in the 2009 economic stimulus bill.
Hypotheses
Our expectations for the determinants of the dividend skipping behavior of banks are based on the size, the level of capitalization, the profitability, and the previous dividend skipping behavior of TARP recipient banks.
Larger banks will find it easier to make quarterly dividend payments because they have greater access to capital markets and they are under more public scrutiny because of their more recognizable brands. Moreover, there is some evidence in Paulson (2010, pp. 362-266) that at least the original TARP recipients, which included the nation's six largest bank holding companies, were pressured to accept the funds. Thus, the U.S.
Treasury may have more adverse selection problems from smaller banks, seeking TARP funds than from larger banks which may have had little choice about entering the program. Therefore, our first hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 1: Smaller banks are more likely to skip dividends.
Better capitalized banks are more likely to pay dividends. Thus, we should expect that banks with higher core, tier 1, capital ratios and banks with higher supplementary capital ratios, tier 2 capital, should be more able to pay dividends. Poorly capitalized banks are often forced by regulators or financial necessity to suspend dividends. Tier 1 capital consists of common stock and some types of preferred stock. Tier 2 capital includes some types of preferred stock and subordinated debt. The Federal Reserve ruled that TARP preferred stock is classified as tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes.
Hypothesis 2: Banks with lower capitalization are more likely to skip dividends.
Return on assets is a scaled measure of bank profitability, which is independent of bank leverage. (That is why we did not use ROE, which depends directly on bank leverage, for the magnitude of the returns.) According to academic studies for nonbanking firms, profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends. See Osobov (2008) and De Angelo et al. (2004) . Similarly, we expect that more profitable banks are more able to pay dividends.
Stock investors are more forward looking than accounting statements. Thus, we should expect that forward looking stock investors are more likely to identify financial difficulties than backward looking financial records. This indicates that banks with higher market-to-book ratios should be less likely to skip TARP dividends.
A bank with more non-performing assets, such as nonaccrual loans, as percent of total assets will be under more pressure from regulators to cut its dividend. A high percentage of problem assets will scare away new private capital. Thus, a manager will likely be forced to suspend dividends if non-performing assets are too high. For this reason, a higher percentage of non-performing assets will make it more likely that a bank will suspend its dividend.
Hypothesis 3: Banks with higher levels of non-performing assets will be more likely to skip dividends.
A bank that has to pay cumulative dividends will be less likely to skip dividends because any missed dividends will have to be made up eventually. In contrast, a noncumulative dividend issuer need not make up missed dividends. We should expect that the cumulative dividend dummy is negatively related to the propensity to skip dividends. Carty (1995) shows that preferred stock dividend pass rates like defaults tend to increase over time. Regulatory orders may specify that banks will suspend dividends. In addition, they may signal legal violations that may harm a bank's reputation with investors. Either situation will make it harder to maintain the preferred stock dividend. Thus, we expect a published regulatory order will be associated with missed TARP dividends.
Data
Our data consists of unbalanced panel of observations. Each bank in the sample has between one and five observations. Each observation is in reference to a TARP The TARP preferred stock issued by all the banks in the sample pays a five percent annual dividend for the first five years and nine percent thereafter. Except for the first dividend and the dividends paid on exit, all the dividends in the sample were due in quarterly amounts of approximately 1.25 percent of the par value of the preferred shares.
We are not aware of any instances where banks paid partial dividends. The banks either paid the full dividend due in the month it was due, or they did not pay any dividend at all. ***Insert Table 1 about here.***
In Table 1 , we present the summary statistics for the sample of 900 quarterly observations. Most of the observations, 91.8 percent, are of bank-quarters where the bank made its scheduled dividend.
The sizes of the banks, as measured by total assets, are skewed, with a few huge banks and many smaller banks. The average bank size of $22.7 billion is not even in the 90 th percentile of the bank-quarter observations. The median bank-quarter observation has only $1.8 billion in assets. 99 percent of banks owe cumulative preferred stock dividends to the U.S. Treasury. Very few bank-quarter observations, 4 percent, have missed a TARP dividend in the prior quarter. Moreover, very few bank-quarter observations, 5.9 percent, have been subject to a regulatory order.
Empirical Results
In this section, we provide empirical tests of our hypotheses about which banks will be more likely to make their quarterly dividends. Large, profitable, better capitalized banks, which have not received regulatory reprimands, have fewer problem loans, and have issued cumulative preferred stocks, are less likely to skip TARP dividends. We also argue that later dividends are more likely to be skipped than earlier dividends. The univariate results in Table 2 generally bear out these predictions. The magnitudes of these differences, which are highlighted in Table 2 , are sometimes large. The average dividend payer has assets of $24.5 billion compared to the average assets of a dividend skipper of $2.3 billion. The non-performing assets as a percent of total assets are 1.5 percent higher for dividend skippers versus dividend payers. It is not unusual for banks to have common equity to total of assets of around 4.5 percent. Thus a 1.5 percent decline in the value of assets could wipe out a third of a bank's equity in such a situation.
***Insert
The logistic regression, also known as the logit model, is used when the dependent variable takes on a value of zero or one. The coefficients estimated in the logit model can be used to make predicted probabilities. Gugarati (1995, p. 544) argues that linear models such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are usually avoided in this situation because they can produce negative probabilities and probabilities greater than one. The OLS linear probability model can also create econometric problems related to violations of normality and serial correlation of the errors.
We use the logistic regression introduced by Cox (1970) to avoid these potential problems. The logistic model is based on the logistic distribution which produces fatter tails than the normal distribution. Let us define p i as the probability that a bank-quarter observation will skip its dividend. This is denoted by the dependent variable, Y, taking on the value 1. Suppose that x i is a row vector of independent variables of the i-th observation in our sample. Let β be a column vector of the coefficients estimated from the model. Thus, Johnston and Dinardo (1997, p. 424) argues the probability of the dependent variable equaling one if the distribution of outcomes is logistic is the following: 
It can be shown that the log odds ratio is equal to
Thus, the log odds ratio is linear. The logit model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
In this section, we study the propensity of publicly traded TARP recipient banks to skip preferred dividend payments. Based on our expectations outlined in the hypotheses section we test the following model:
Probability of skipping dividends = f [size, profitability, market-to-book, capitalization, non-performing assets, previous 
dividend skipping dummy (for each quarter), regulatory order dummy]
Let us proceed with several specifications of the above logistic model. In Tables   3 and 4 , we attempt to predict a bank's likelihood of missing the TARP dividend in a given quarter. Table 3 about here.***
***Insert
In Table 3 , we present the results of the propensity of publicly traded TARP recipient bank to skip dividends. To measure the impact of bank size we use log of assets, similar to Gropp and Heider (2010) . In Model 1 of Table 3 , we include the accounting variables and the cumulative dividend dummy. The results suggest that smaller banks are more likely to miss dividends, consistent with Hypothesis 1 and that banks with a greater percent of non-performing assets are significantly more likely to miss a dividend, consistent with our Hypothesis 3. The tier 2 capital ratio is significantly negatively related to missing a dividend. The tier 2 capital ratio, even more than the tier 1 capital ratio, may be a good signal of a banks ability to tap capital markets, consistent with our Hypothesis 2. We looked for the banks that had publicly traded preferred stock or subordinated debt on the FINRA market data site. Most of the banks in our sample had less than $10 billion in assets, according to Table 1 . Of the banks issuing preferred stock and warrants in exchange for TARP funds with under $10 billion in assets in 2008, there were only four banks with preferred stock or subordinated debt that had been traded within the last month when we searched. Thus, the tier 2 capital ratio may be a proxy for the ability to tap capital markets even more than the core capital ratio. Banks with few opportunities to raise capital will be much more likely to suspend dividends to conserve capital.
In Model 2 of Table 3 , we add a dummy variable indicating whether banks missed prior dividends. The prior missed dividend dummy variable was positive and significant, consistent with our Hypothesis 4. Nevertheless, that variable is a lagged dependent variable. Since the standard issues associated with time series models are not easily addressed in logit models or models containing independent variables, the results in Model 2 should be treated with some caution.
In Model 3 of Table 3 , we add quarterly dummy variables to study the dividend skipping behavior based on prior months' dividend behavior. The tier 1 capital ratio was negative and significant as predicted when the quarterly dummy variables were added.
Further, as the t-tests in Table 2 Table 3 , we add regulatory order dummy variable. The rest of the variables of interest maintain their significance, and we find some evidence that a regulatory order will be associated with an increased propensity of dividend skipping. Table 4 about here.*** Because missing the previous quarter's dividend is a strong predictor of a bank's missing the present quarter's dividend, we have split the sample in two based on previous dividend skipping behavior and the results are presented in Table 4 . The log odds of missing a dividend in Models 1 and 3 of Table 4 are conditional on the bank-observation not missing its TARP dividend in the prior quarter. Likewise, the log odds of the bankquarter observation missing a TARP dividend in Models 2 and 4 are conditional on the bank-quarter observation missing the prior quarter's dividend. In this way, we avoid putting a lagged dependent variable in the regression as in Model 2 of Table 3 , but we address the impact of a prior missed dividend on the probability that a bank will continue to miss its TARP dividends.
In Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 we study the determinants of the propensity of banks to skip dividends using all of the independent variables from Table 3 . Model 1
suggests that a bank's size is significantly negatively related to skipping a dividend for banks that did not miss their prior dividend, consistent with our Hypothesis 1. Yet, the log of total assets is not significant for banks that missed their last dividend. Thus, if a big bank misses a dividend, it is probably just as likely to miss the next dividend as a small bank. Model 1 also suggests that a higher tier 2 capital ratio makes a bank significantly less likely to miss a dividend, given that they did not miss their prior dividend. Model 2 of Table 4 suggests that there is no significant relationship between the tier 2 ratio for banks that missed their prior TARP dividend. The non-performing assets ratio is still significant and positively related to skipping dividend in Model 1 of Table 4 . Model 1 also suggests that the only quarterly dividend dummy variable that impacts the propensity of banks to skip dividends is the August 2009 dividend dummy and the May 2009 dummy is not significant anymore.
Model 2 of Table 4 shows the results for banks which missed prior dividends.
The larger part of the sample (864 observations) is based on the bank-quarter observations where no previous dividend was skipped. There are only 36 bank-quarter observations where a prior dividend was missed. This lack of observations probably leads to the lack of significance in Model 2 which has 12 independent variables. Yet, it generates the highest pseudo R-squared by far of 74 percent.
In Models 3 and 4 we drop the quarterly dummies and the regulatory order dummy. The results suggest that both size and ROA significantly increase the propensity of banks to skip dividends when banks skipped prior dividends and non-performing assets significant increase the dividend skipping behavior for both banks that missed and did not miss prior dividends.
In Model 4, the pseudo R-squared goes down as the quarterly dummies and the regulatory order dummies are dropped. Interestingly, a higher return on assets is associated with a higher likelihood of missing a dividend in Model 4, contrary to the predicted sign and the t-test results in Table 2 . It is not clear why this would be the case.
Indeed, given that a bank did not miss its prior TARP dividend, in Model 3, a higher return on assets makes a bank significantly less likely to miss a TARP dividend.
Finally, non-performing asset ratios are still significant and positively related to skipping dividends, according to Models 1, 3, and 4 in Table 4 . In Model 4, the coefficient is much larger than the coefficient in Model 3. Thus our results suggest that non-performing asset ratios may become more important for prior dividend skippers than for banks which did not skip dividends in Model 3.
Conclusion
This is the first study to rigorously test factors that lead firms to skip preferred stock dividends. Moreover, it is the first empirical study to look at the characteristics of banks that skip preferred stock dividends from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). As Carty (1995) documents, missed preferred stock dividends usually coincided with a preferred stock that traded far below par. Thus, missed preferred stock dividends are economically meaningful, and may be an early warning sign of financial distress. Smaller banks, banks with lower tier 2 capital ratios, and banks with more problem assets are likely candidates to skip their TARP dividends. Since pending legislation proposes to inject $30 billion more preferred stock into small banks with less than $10 billion in assets, 6 the current study lends support to the notion that that program may be a very risky proposition. 
